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Fair Play: The Tension Between an Athletic
Association's Regulatory Power and Free Speech Rights
of Member Schools - The Practical Implications of
Tennessee v. Brentwood
By Aaron Echols*
I. INTRODUCTION
We always want to protect the interests of our youth and prevent
them from being pressured or unduly influenced in making an
important decision. But where does that desire conflict with a
school's First Amendment right in trying to persuade students to
attend their school?
The First Amendment explains, "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances."' In addition, the
Fourteenth Amendment also explains, "nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."2
Since the formation of the Constitution, our national government
and judicial system have been laying out the boundaries for First
Amendment protection and what exactly constitutes a violation of
First Amendment rights. The same judicial system has attempted to
define the protection afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment ever
since its creation in the post Civil War era. While there has been
wide protection of First Amendment freedom of speech rights,
* J.D. candidate May 2009.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
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speech is not afforded absolute protection.3 In fact, the Supreme
Court has held in numerous cases that an individual or entity's First
Amendment rights to free speech was not per se violated simply
because punishment was handed down for acts that included or were
limited to speech.4 For example, there are instances where courts
have upheld punishments against individuals because the court felt
the employer's and state's interest in regulating speech/behavior was
greater than the individual's First Amendment rights to unrestrained
speech.5  In deciding whether an individual's rights have been
infringed upon without the proper due process of law, the courts have
evaluated the purposes behind speech restrictions and the process by
which those restrictions were enforced.6
Courts have often found violations of due process in situations
where punishments were assessed without hearings, investigations or
other processes being utilized to allow individuals to have their
interests represented. Claims alleging violations of First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights often occur in situations where
3. See Davis v. Comm'r of Mass., 167 U.S. 43 (1897) ("For the legislature
absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is
no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner
of a private house to forbid it in his house.") Id. at 47.
4. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907). In Patterson, defendant
was punished for running certain articles and cartoons that questioned the Supreme
Court of Colorado. Id. at 458-59. Defendant claimed the articles and cartoons
were true and were protected under the First Amendment of the Constitution. Id. at
461. The Court, however, disagreed and held that "the main purpose of such
constitutional provisions is 'to prevent all such previous restraints upon
publications as had been practiced by other governments' and they do not prevent
the subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to the public
welfare." Id. at 462 (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988)). Appellants
were strongly opposed to abortion and wanted to express themselves by picketing
outside the residence of a doctor who performed abortions at two nearby clinics.
Id. at 476. The Town Board decided to enact an ordinance that "prohibited all
picketing in residential neighborhoods except for labor picketing." Id. Appellants
challenged the ordinance saying that the ordinance violated their First Amendment
rights. Id. at 477. The Court held that, "[t]he nature and scope of this interest
make the ban narrowly tailored. The ordinance also leaves open ample alternative
channels of communication and is content-neutral." Id. at 488.
5. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); see also Fox v. Washington,
236 U.S. 273 (1915).
6. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
7. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
administrative bodies have taken action against individuals under
their supervision. In such cases, the decision turns on the nature of
the speech that has been restricted by the administrative body, and
whether the administrative body's interest in regulating the speech or
behavior in question outweighs the individual's interest to speak or
act as they choose.8
This case note will focus on the development of free speech
rights and how those free speech rights co-exist with the rights of
administrative bodies to regulate the speech and behavior of
members. In particular, this case note will examine the tension
between the free speech rights of member schools trying to advertise
the benefits of attending their school and the regulatory interests of
an athletic association seeking to ensure fair athletic competition and
academic priority over athletics.
II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND
The rights to free speech and due process originated with the
creation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
The First Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances."9  Over time, this Amendment has been
construed to protect everything from expressing negative opinions
about public officials to various forms of protesting. 10 This is not an
absolute right however, and courts have found certain restrictions on
speech to be appropriate. 1'
Not long after the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, actions were
brought claiming the protection of Section 1983, but it was unclear
exactly what powers and rights were intended to be conferred by 42
U.S.C. §1983.12
8. Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-52.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10. See Davis v. Comm'r of Mass., 167 U.S. 43 (1897); Patterson v. Colorado,
205 U.S. 454 (1907); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 362 (1931).
11. See Davis, 167 U.S. at 43; Connick, 461 U.S. 151-52.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any
action brought against a judicial officer for an act or
omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief
was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District
of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the
District of Columbia.' 3
Monroe v. Pape was one of the early cases which considered the
scope of Section 1983. In Monroe, the police officers broke into
Monroe's home and made him and his wife stand naked in the living
room as they went through the rest of the house. 4 Monroe alleged
that the officers did not have any authority or a warrant to justify
these actions and that they "acted 'under color of statutes, ordinances,
regulations, customs and usages' of Illinois and of the City of
Chicago. 1 5 Monroe attempted to bring his claim in federal court by
establishing federal jurisdiction under Section 1983.16
There can be no doubt at least since Ex parte Virginia,
100 U.S. 339, 346-347, 25 L.Ed. 676, that Congress
has the power to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment against those who carry a badge of
authority of a State and represent it in some capacity,
13. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
14. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 169.
15. Id.
16. Id.
whether they act in accordance with their authority or
misuse it. [citation omitted] The question with which
we now deal is the narrower one of whether Congress,
in enacting [42 U.S.C. § 1983], meant to give a
remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights,
privileges and immunities by an official's abuse of his
position. [citations omitted] We conclude that it did so
intend. 1 7
The Court went on to explain that Section 1983 had three primary
purposes.' 8 First, it was said to "prohibit any invidious legislation by
States against the rights or privileges of citizens of the United
States."1 9  Second, "it provided a remedy where state law was
inadequate," particularly in terms of discrimination. 20  Third, the
"aim was to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though
adequate in theory, was not available in practice." 2'
In Mitchum, the lower court issued an injunction against a local
bookstore to have it shut down because the bookstore was alleged to
be a public nuisance.22 After a series of relatively ineffective actions
in the state court system, Mitchum filed a complaint in federal court
"alleging that the actions of the state judicial and law enforcement
officials were depriving him of rights protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. 23  The Court considered the issue of
whether Section 1983 allowed federal courts to grant relief in state
court proceedings.2 4  The Court explained that Section 1983 was
enacted for the "express purpose of 'enforc[ing] the Provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment."' 25 The Court explained that Section 1983
put the federal government in the position of "guarantor of basic
17. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171-72.
18. Id. at 173.
19. Id. at 173-74.
20. Id. at 174.
21. Id.
22. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 227 (quoting 17 Stat. 13, 4 2 nd Cong., 1 Sess., Ch.
22(1871)).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 229.
25. Id. at 238.
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federal rights against state power."26  "Section 1983 opened the
federal courts to private citizens, offering a uniquely federal remedy
against incursions under the claimed authority of state law upon
rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the Nation. '"27
Under the incorporation doctrine, the Fourteenth Amendment
protects certain fundamental rights from state action.27 With the
incorporation doctrine and the Supreme Court holdings explaining
the scope of Section 1983, an individual's right to free speech under
the First Amendment was granted further protection. The
combination of the two clearly eliminated the absolute right of an
administrative body, found to be a state actor, to regulate the speech
of members and claim the protection of law and state sovereignty.
Many judicial decisions have attempted to shape the scope of free
speech and define the line between an individual's rights and an
administrative body's interest in regulating the speech and behavior
of its member organizations.
III. CASE LAW BACKGROUND
Countless cases have dealt with the ability of the government as
well as private entities to act as administrative bodies and
appropriately regulate the speech and behavior of others.28 These
26. Id. at 239.
27. Id.
27. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) rev'd on other grounds
(holding that for a right to be incorporated under the Due Process clause, the right
must be one that is "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to
be ranked as fundamental.").
28. See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004). A police officer was
fired after he made videos of himself stripping and performing sexual acts and sold
the videos on Ebay®. Id. at 78. Facts uncovered in an independent investigation
and Roe actually selling a tape to an undercover officer caused a committee to
decide Roe had violated several specific policies of the police department
"including conduct unbecoming of an officer." Id at 79. Roe failed to follow
orders to remove all the materials from the internet and was cited and fired. Id. at
78-79. Roe alleged the termination violated his First Amendment rights. Id. at 79.
The Court held that a governmental employer could impose restrictions on
employees that would be unconstitutional if applied to non-government employees.
Id. at 80. The Court further held that Roe's speech was not a matter of public
concern and was detrimental to the interests of the employer. Id. at 84. See also
Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995). Went For It, Inc., a lawyer
free speech issues have ranged from a teacher's ability to talk about
issues in the school, to the dissemination of pornographic material, or
a retailer's ability to advertise.2 9 In Pickering v. Board of Education
of Township High School District 205, a teacher criticized the
financial responsibility of the school board and was subsequently
fired.3" The school board held a hearing, as required, and attempted
to justify the action taken in firing the teacher by claiming many of
the teacher's allegations about financial irresponsibility were false
and harmful to the school board's reputation and ability to maintain a
disciplined faculty.3' In the hearing reviewed by the Illinois courts,
the teacher alleged that the school board fired him for speaking out
about how the school's financial handlings violated his First
Amendment rights.32 The Illinois courts dismissed the teacher's First
Amendment claims on the grounds that teachers do not enjoy the
right to make negative remarks about the operations of schools. 33 On
review, the Supreme Court held that teachers were the members of
the academic community most likely to have informed opinions, and
therefore teachers must have the ability to speak freely about how
referral service, filed suit seeking injunctive relief from a Florida statute that
prohibited client solicitation by direct mailings for the first thirty days after an
accident. Id. at 621. Went For It alleged that this statute violated their First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. The Court upheld the statute stating that the
state bar had a substantial interest in protecting citizens from overreaching by
lawyers and that the statute was properly fashioned to meet those ends. Id. at 635.
See also State v. Fowler, 83 A.2d 67 (R.I. 1951). Fowler was charged "with
making a public address to a religious meeting" in a public park, in violation of a
city ordinance. Id. at 67. Fowler alleged that the statute and his punishment
violated his free speech and free assembly rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Id. The court held that the ordinance was valid because the
ordinance did not restrict the right to free speech but instead only sought to prevent
activities that could lead to "annoyance and disorder," defeating the proper use of
the park. Id. at 68.
29. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Township High Sch. Dist. 205, 391
U.S. 563 (1968); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
30. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566.
31. Id. at 567.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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funds for the operation of the school are spent without fear of being
fired.3 4
Outside of allowing employees to speak freely about employment
conditions, cases have also dealt with a state's interest in regulating
material made available to the state's citizens. 35  In Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, a suit was filed to enjoin two theatres from
34. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 563. The Brentwood Court uses the Pickering
holding to illustrate the need for a balance between the employee's rights to
comment on matters of public concern against the State's interest as an employer,
to run an efficient workplace. Tennessee v. Brentwood, 127 S. Ct. 2489, 2495
(2007).
35. See Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973). The owner of an adult
book store was convicted for violating an obscenity statute. Id. at 116. An
undercover police officer entered an adult book store and purchased a book that
violated the obscenity statute. Id. The obscenity statute defined obscene material
as material relating to nudity or sexuality that "goes substantially beyond
customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters and is
matter which is utterly without redeeming social importance." Id. at 116 n.2. The
Court held that not all books were protected by the First Amendment, and obscene
material was not protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 118-19. The Court held
that the state could regulate obscene material without violating the book store
owner's First Amendment rights. Id. at 118-19. See also Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991). Two establishments that wanted to provide all nude
dancing, challenged a statute that prohibited complete nudity. Id. at 562-63. The
statute required that dancers wear "pasties" and "G-strings" when dancing. Id. at
563. The owners of the establishment claimed that the statute violated freedom of
expression rights under the First Amendment. Id. at 563-64. The Court held that
the statute did not suppress free expression and that the state could enforce the
statute because the state had an interest in protecting morals and public order. Id.
at 569-70. See also Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527
U.S. 173 (1999). Broadcasters challenged FCC regulations that prohibited stations
from airing any advertisements about otherwise legal casinos in the area. Id. at
180. The regulations prohibited any advertising about the lottery or other games of
chance and the broadcasters alleged that the regulations violated their First
Amendment rights. Id. The Court held that the regulations did violate the First
Amendment. Id. at 188-89. See also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525
(2001). Tobacco retailers and manufacturers challenged regulations on the
advertising and sale of tobacco products. Id. at 532. The regulations prohibited
any outdoor advertising within 1,000 feet of any public playground, elementary, or
secondary school. Id. at 534-35. The Court held that the ban on outdoor
advertising violated the manufacturers' and retailers' First Amendment rights
because there was not a "reasonable fit between the means and the ends of the
regulatory scheme." Id. at 561-62.
showing allegedly obscene movies.36 The theatres were planning to
show two movies that contained material the state of Georgia
believed to be "hard core pornography" and the state attempted to
prevent the movies from being shown by enforcing a state statute that
made it illegal to show obscene materials.37 The theatres challenged
the injunction and the statute, alleging a violation of their First
Amendment rights. 38 The Supreme Court held that the state had an
interest in regulating obscene materials and that the state statute was
acceptable, as long as the applicable statute met First Amendment
standards. 39 In Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, two separate state
regulations prohibited advertisement of liquor prices anywhere other
than the place of sale.4' The first regulation prohibited any form of
advertising by liquor retailers other than "price tags or signs
displayed with the merchandise within licensed premises and not
visible from the street., 41  The second regulation prohibited any
advertising through Rhode Island media which mentioned the prices
of alcoholic beverages.42  A licensed liquor retailer sought a
declaratory judgment that the ban was a violation of the First
Amendment. 43 The Court explained that a state has an interest in
protecting its consumers by regulating advertising to ensure the
dissemination of truthful information.a The Court also pointed out
however that there must be a relationship between the ban and the
necessary protection, and that in this case the absolute ban, on
36. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,49 (1973).
37. Id. at 51-52.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 57. Brentwood uses this case to illustrate the Tennessee Secondary
School Athletic Association's (TSSAA) interest in preventing hard-sell tactics
directed at middle school students that could lead to exploitation, distorted
competition between teams, and give athletics priority over academics. Brentwood,
127 S. Ct. at 2495-96.
40. Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
41. Id. at 489.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 484.
44. Id. at 496.
Spring 2008 Fair Play
246 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 28-1
otherwise accurate advertising of the price of liquor, violated the
retailer's First Amendment rights.4 5
In addition to deciding the constitutionality of restrictions on
commercial advertising and the actions of retailers, courts have also
been faced with the constitutionality of restrictions placed on
professionals engaged in more service-oriented industries. 46  In
Edenfield v. Fane, a certified public accountant challenged a state
wide ban on in-person solicitation. 47 The Court held this ban violated
the certified public accountant's First Amendment rights in regards to
his ability and desire to communicate truthful information to
prospective clients.48
45. Id. at 516. Brentwood uses Liquormart to illustrate the constitutional
difference between "prohibiting appeals to the public at large [citations omitted]
and rules prohibiting direct, personalized communication in a coercive setting."
Brentwood, 127 S. Ct. at 2493.
46. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557 (1980). Central Hudson challenged a state ban that prevented electric
companies from using any advertising that promoted the use of electricity. Id. at
558-59. Central challenged the ban, alleging that it violated Central's First
Amendment rights. Id. at 559. The public service commission sought to justify the
ban by stating it promoted the national plan to conserve energy. Id. at 559-60. The
Court explained that restrictions on honest commercial speech can only go as far as
the interest sought to be served. Id. at 565. The Court held the ban was too broad
in prohibiting all advertising about electricity services, and must be struck down
under the First Amendment. Id. at 570-71. See also Peel v. Attorney Registration
& Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91 (1990). An attorney was disciplined
for holding himself out to be a specialist in a field that was not approved for
advertising claiming specialization. Id. at 97. The attorney was listed as a certified
trial specialist by the National Board of Trial Advocacy and the attorney referenced
this specialization in his letterhead. Id. at 96. The disciplinary commission
recommended that the attorney be censured for the violation and rejected his claim
that the advertisement of his specialization was protected by the First Amendment.
Id. at 97-98. The Court held that the attorney's reference to his specialization was
truthful and explained that the Commission's concern about attorney's making
misleading statements about specialization was not sufficient to outweigh the
attorney's right to advertise his specialization truthfully under the First
Amendment. Id. at 110-11.
47. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
48. Id. at 777. Brentwood uses this case to illustrate the intended narrow
holding of Ohralik, explaining the Court has not been quick to invalidate state
regulations on solicitation and commercial advertising without the risks associated
with in-person solicitation. Brentwood, 127 S. Ct. at 2494.
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, two attorneys violated a rule
prohibiting advertising and were sanctioned by the state bar.49 The
Supreme Court held the advertising was truthful and was protected
by the First Amendment.5 ° In Zauder v. Disciplinary Counsel of
Supreme Court of Ohio, an attorney challenged his punishment for
running two separate ads in local newspapers. 51 One ad offered to
represent individuals facing charges of drunk driving and explained
that there would be no charge if the individual was in fact
convicted. 52  The attorney was informed that this advertisement
looked like an offer to represent criminal defendants on a
contingency-fee basis, which was a violation of the Ohio ethics
rules.53 The attorney withdrew the advertisement and did not take
any employment opportunities that resulted from the ad.54 The
attorney then ran a second advertisement offering representation to
women who had been harmed by a contraceptive device." The
complaint filed against the attorney alleged that this advertisement
violated disciplinary rules that prohibited the use of illustrations in
advertisements. 56  This disciplinary rule required an attorney's
advertisements to be "dignified" and prohibited an attorney from
taking employment after the attorney gave unsolicited advice to an
individual when the advice consisted of telling the individual that he
should pursue legal action. 57  The Court held that there was no
justification for prohibiting advertisements aimed at people with a
specific legal problem.58 The Court further held that the interest in
preventing in-person solicitation was not implicated by the
newspaper advertisements and that the attorney must be allowed to
49. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
50. Id. at 383. Brentwood used Bates to explain the difference between
regulations on conduct and regulations on speech.
51. Zauder v. Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626
(1985).
52. Id. at 629-30.
53. Id. at 630.
54.Id.
55. Id. at 630-3 1.
56. Id. at 631-33.
57. Id. at 631-33.
58. Id. at 655-56.
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advertise using truthful information.5 9  In Connick v. Myers, an
assistant district attorney alleged she was fired for exercising her
First Amendment right of free speech.6" When she was confronted
with the possibility of being transferred, which she opposed, she
circulated a questionnaire throughout the office.6 ' The questionnaire
asked about the need for a grievance committee, office morale, and
concern about the district attorney's transfer policy.62 The Supreme
Court held that her First Amendment rights were not violated when
she was terminated, because the questionnaire did not address matters
of public concern, placing it outside the scope of First Amendment
protection.63 The Court explained that her employer had a right to
promote an efficient workplace by regulating the speech of their
employees. 64
Once an entity is determined to be a state actor, the standard for
determining the constitutionality of action taken regulating speech of
employees is much higher.65 When an administrative body that is a
state actor places restrictions on a member's constitutional rights
based on a contractual or voluntary relationship, a balancing test is
used to weigh the administrative body's interest against the
member's interest. This balancing test is used to make sure that
constitutionally protected rights are not being improperly denied.66
In Rust v. Sullivan, a statute allowed money to be given, under Title
X of the Public Health Service Act, to organizations providing family
59. Id. at 656 (invalidating a restriction on truthful, nondeceptive legal
advertising directed at people with specific legal problems).
60. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 138 (1983).
61. Id. at 140-41.
62. Id. at 141.
63. Id. at 154 (holding Myers' employer was not required under the First
Amendment to "tolerate action which he reasonably believed would disrupt the
office, undermine his authority, and destroy close working relationships").
64. Id. Brentwood uses Connick to parallel the government's interest in
running an effective workplace, which outweighed the right to absolute free
speech, with TSSAA's interest in running a fair athletic league by regulating the
speech of its participants. Brentwood, 127 S. Ct. at 2495.
65. See Rumsfield v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47
(2006).
66. See O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 719
(1996) ("the inquiry is whether the [political party] affiliation requirement is a
reasonable one").
planning services with the conditions that the money given to the
organization not be used for abortion-related speech.67 The Court
explained that "when the Government appropriates public funds to
establish a program it is entitled to define the limits of that
program." 68 The Court held the statute was constitutional because
any restraints that were present on the plaintiffs speech were "a
consequence of [the plaintiffs] decision to accept employment in a
project, the scope of which is permissibly restricted by the funding
authority." 69
The Brentwood opinion relies primarily on the Supreme Court's
decision in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association.70 There the Court
held that "the State - or the Bar acting with state authorization -
constitutionally may discipline a lawyer for soliciting clients in
person, for pecuniary gain, under circumstances likely to pose
dangers that the State has a right to prevent." 71 Ohralik was an
attorney and a practicing member of the Ohio Bar.72 While picking
up his mail at the local post office, Ohralik heard that local resident
Carol McClintock had recently been injured in a car accident.73
Ohralik called McClintock's parents and "suggested that he might
visit Carol in the hospital. 74 During the phone conversation, Carol's
parents agreed that Ohralik could visit Carol in the hospital, but
asked him to stop by their home before visiting the hospital.75 Once
Ohralik arrived at the home, the McClintocks explained the
circumstances of Carol's auto accident.76  The McClintocks
explained that Carol's car was struck by the car of an uninsured
motorist. 77  Carol's parents also told Ohralik that Carol's friend
Wanda Lou was in the car with Carol at the time of the accident and
67. Rust v. Sullivan 500 U.S. 173, 177-78 (1991).
68. Id. at 193-94.
69. Id. at 199.
70. Brentwood, 127 S. Ct. at 2493.
71. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 449 (1978).
72. Id. at 449.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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that both Wanda Lou and Carol were injured.78 Ohralik suggested
that the McClintocks hire a lawyer but Carol's parents said they
would leave that decision to Carol because she was eighteen years
old and would be the beneficiary of any lawsuit.79
Ohralik left the McClintocks' home and proceeded to the hospital
"where he found Carol lying in traction in her room." 80 He talked to
her briefly and explained that he would represent her if she would
sign an attorney-client agreement.8' Carol said she would have to
discuss the matter with her parents before she signed any agreement
and asked Ohralik to tell her parents to come visit her.82 Ohralik
waited until all of Carol's other visitors had left and he took pictures
of Carol in traction.83 On his way back to the McClintock home,
Orhalik stopped at the scene of the accident to take pictures.84
Ohralik also stopped to buy a tape recorder.85
During his second visit at the McClintock home, Ohralik hid his
newly acquired tape recorder under his raincoat and recorded the
conversation.86 Ohralik and the McClintocks discussed the
McClintocks' insurance policy and the consequences of being struck
by an uninsured motorist.87 Ohralik explained that their insurance
policy contained an uninsured motorist clause that would provide
benefits of up to $12,500 for both Carol and Wanda Lou.88 Carol's
parents told Ohralik that Wanda Lou "swore up and down" that she
did not want to sue but Carol had in fact called home and told them
to tell Ohralik he could proceed with the matter. 89 Two days later,
Ohralik visited Carol in the hospital for a second time, and had her
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 450.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
Spring 2008
sign a contract stating he would receive one-third of her recovery
from any lawsuit. 90
Ohralik obtained Wanda Lou's address from the McClintock
family and proceeded to her house uninvited.91 Ohralik once again
hid the tape recorder under his coat and recorded most of his
conversation with Wanda Lou.92  During his conversation with
Wanda Lou, Ohralik explained the terms of the McClintocks'
insurance coverage and Wanda Lou's recovery options as a
passenger in the car. 93 He offered to represent Wanda Lou in an
action to recover the insurance benefits in exchange for the same
one-third contingency fee agreement he had reached with Carol. 94
There was a dispute as to whether Ohralik recorded the full
conversation in its entirety, but ultimately, Wanda Lou stated, "O.K."
when presented with Ohralik's proposition of representation to
recover the insurance proceeds. 95 The next day, Wanda Lou's
mother attempted to invalidate her daughter's consent by explaining
they did not want to sue anyone and would consult their own lawyer
if they decided to sue. 96 Ohralik however, maintained that Wanda
Lou had created a binding agreement.97 Wanda Lou notified Ohralik
a month later that she did not want to sue anyone and did not want to
be represented by him.98  She also asked Ohralik to notify the
insurance company that he was not representing her so the insurance
company would agree to release her check.99
Carol McClintock also eventually disposed of Ohralik as her
attorney but still paid him one-third of her recovery after he sued her
for breach of contract. 100 Later, Carol and Wanda Lou both filed
complaints against Ohralik with the Grievance Committee of the
Geauga County Bar Association and the Board decided Ohralik had
90. Id.
91. Id. at 451.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 451-52.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 452.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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violated two portions of the Ohio Code of Professional
Responsibility.' 0' The Board also rejected Ohralik's claim that his
actions were protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.' 0 2
The Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the Board's decision and actually
increased Ohralik's punishment to an indefinite suspension. 0 3
The primary issue presented in Ohralik was whether the State or
the bar can punish an attorney for soliciting clients in person for
pecuniary gain.0 4 The Ohralik Court held, "The State - or the Bar
acting with state authorization - constitutionally may discipline a
lawyer for soliciting clients in person, for pecuniary gain, under
circumstances likely to pose dangers that the State has a right to
prevent."' 1 5  The Ohralik Court went on to explain that a lawyer
soliciting business in person with a prospective client has long been
seen as contrary to the ideal attorney-client relationship and an action
that poses serious potential to harm the prospective client. 0 6
Furthermore, the Court stated that soliciting professional services in
person is not the same as permissive truthful advertising, and is
certainly different than the "forms of speech more traditionally
within the concern of the First Amendment."' 1 7 The Court supported
this holding by stating that the "common sense" approach was still
used when it came to distinguishing between speech surrounding a
commercial transaction and speech in an arena "traditionally subject
to government regulation."10
8
101. Id.
102. Id. at 453.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 448-49.
105. Id. at 449 (explaining that the Bates Court "held that truthful advertising
of 'routine' legal services is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
against blanket prohibition by a State. The Court expressly reserved the question
of the permissible scope of regulation of 'in-person solicitation of clients - at the
hospital room or the accident site, or in any other situation that breeds undue
influence').
106. Id. See also Brentwood, 127 S. Ct. at 2494; Brentwood highlighted
Ohralik's use of Bates to illustrate the "evils" of in-person solicitation. Brentwood
explained the pressure on individuals may actually prevent them from making the
informed and reliable decisions sought in Bates. Brentwood, 127 S. Ct. at 2494.
107. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449.
108. Id. at 456; see Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976) (protecting speech that was purely commercial in nature but
The Orhalik Court further developed circumstances where speech
could be regulated without offending an individual's First
Amendment rights. 10 9 "It has never been deemed an abridgement of
freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal
merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or
carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or
printed."1 10 The Court pointed out that, "[n]umerous examples could
be cited of communications that are regulated without offending the
First Amendment," and explained that it was essential to protect the
consumer because "[t]he aim and effect of in-person solicitation may
be to provide a one-sided presentation and to encourage speedy and
perhaps uninformed decision making."'11 The Court pointed out that
in-person solicitation for legal services could "encourage persons
needing counsel from engaging in a critical comparison of the
'availability, nature, and prices' of legal services." '112 In fact, the
Court believed that such solicitation may actually go against the
interest, identified in Bates, of hoping to promote decisions that are
reliable and well informed.113
The Court added to the analysis by explaining that the State has
an interest in protecting consumers through regulating commercial
activity, but also has a special interest in maintaining appropriate
standards for licensed professionals." 4
pointing out that commercial speech was differentiable from other forms of
speech).
109. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456.
110. Id. (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502).
In Giboney, Empire Ice sought enforcement of a state regulation to prevent
plaintiff/employees from picketing. Id. at 492-93. The Court upheld the state
regulation, holding that it did not violate the employees' rights under the First
Amendment. Giboney, 336 U.S. at 504.
111. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456-57.
112. Id. at 457-58.
113. Id. at 458; see also Zauder v. Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985). Brentwood refers to the Zauder case to illustrate the
point that situations like the one faced in Brentwood and Ohralik "involved a
practice rife with possibilities for overreaching, invasion of privacy, the exercise of
undue influence, and outright fraud." Brentwood, 127 S. Ct. at 2494.
114. Id.
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Neither Virginia Pharmacy nor Bates purported to
cast doubt on the permissibility of these kinds of
commercial regulation. In-person solicitation by a
lawyer of remunerative employment is a business
transaction in which speech is an essential but
subordinate component. While this does not remove
the speech from the protection of the First
Amendment, as was held in Bates and Virginia
Pharmacy, it lowers the level of appropriate judicial
scrutiny.'15
The Court pointed out that even the appellant conceded the State
had a "compelling interest in preventing those aspects of solicitation
that involve fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overreaching" and
other types of troublesome behavior."16 The Court reasoned that the
guidelines prohibiting in-person solicitation were preventative
measures and were meant to deter harm before it occurred.' 17 In
illustrating the possible negative consequences of face-to-face
solicitation, the Court explained that these dangers have been
apparent to the Federal Trade Commission and have been
appropriately handled by the Federal Trade Commission." 8  The
Court went on to state that people might place their trust in an
unqualified lawyer simply because of the lawyer's power of
persuasion if the circumstances were such that they would be likely
to cause an individual to acquiesce to the lawyer and his advice, even
though the individual was uninformed." 9
The Court explained that if the appellant's view prevailed, in-
person solicitation could rarely be regulated by the State, essentially
circumventing the State's great interest in regulating lawyers in an
"effective, objective, and self-enforcing manner."' 120 For all of these
reasons, the Court held that the Constitution, in particular an
individual's First Amendment rights to free speech, was not violated
115. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456-57.
116. Id. at 462.
117. Id. at 464.
118. Id. at 465.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 466-67.
by a State enforcing proactive measures to prevent the harm of its
citizens.121
IV. FACTS
A. Procedural History
The Brentwood case at hand was actually preceded by another
action between Brentwood and the Tennessee Secondary School
Athletic Association (hereinafter "TSSAA") that also reached the
Supreme Court. 122 The primary issue in the first Brentwood action
(hereinafter "Brentwood ") was whether TSSAA was a state actor
when they enforced a rule prohibiting member schools from
recruiting middle school athletes. 123  The District Court found
TSSAA to be a state actor but the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed, holding that TSSAA was not a state actor when
enforcing rules against its member schools." 124
The Supreme Court explained the standard for state action by
stating that "state action may be found if, though only if, there is such
a 'close nexus between the State and the challenged action' that
seemingly private behavior 'may be fairly treated as that of the State
itself."125
[A] challenged activity may be state action when it
results from the State's exercise of "coercive power,"
[citation omitted] when the State provides "significant
encouragement, either overt or covert," [citation
omitted] or when a private actor operates as a "willful
participant in joint activity with the State or its agents"
[citation omitted]. We have treated a nominally
private entity as a state actor when it is controlled by
an "agency of the State," [citation omitted] when it
has been delegated a public function by the State,
121. Id. at 467.
122. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288
(2001) (hereinafter Brentwood Acad.).
123. BrentwoodAcad., 531 U.S. at 290.
124. Id. at 293-94.
125. Id. at 295 (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974)).
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[citation omitted] when it is "entwined with
governmental policies," or when government is
"entwined in [its] management or control[.]' 126
Contrary to the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that
TSSAA was in fact a state actor.1 27 The Court began the reasoning
for their holding by stating, "[t]he nominally private character of the
Association is overborne by the pervasive entwinement of public
institutions and public officials in its composition and workings, and
there is no substantial reason to claim unfairness in applying
constitutional standards to it."' 12 8 The Court pointed out that public
school officials represented their respective institutions within
TSSAA, and were acting within the scope of their duties through this
representation.1 29  The Court explained that TSSAA was a
"mechanism to produce rules and regulate competition" that was
"overwhelmingly composed of public school officials" to "adopt and
enforce the rules that make the system work."'130 The Court reasoned
that because the public schools essentially delegated these jobs to
TSSAA, it was as if the schools were exercising their own authority
to meet the goals and responsibilities of TSSAA.' 3 1 The Court
believed that TSSAA would not exist without the public school
officials that represented their schools within TSSAA because those
public officials did not "merely control but overwhelmingly
perform[ed] all but the purely ministerial acts by which the
Association exists and functions in practical terms."' 13 2 The Court
illustrated the extent of the entwinement by pointing out that "[o]nly
the 16% minority of private school memberships prevents this
entwinement from being total and their identities [being] totally
indistinguishable."' 33  The Court also stated that while most of
TSSAA's money came from the admission charged for games,
126. Id. at 296.
127. Id. at 294.
128. Id. at 298.
129. Id. at 299.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 299-300.
133. Id. at 300.
TSSAA was basically using the moneymaking capacity of the
schools "as its own."'1 34 The Court further believed that "the State
Board once freely acknowledged the Association's official character
but now does it by winks and nods." 135  The Court held,
"[e]ntwinement will support a conclusion that an ostensibly private
organization ought to be charged with a public character and judged
by constitutional standards; entwinement to the degree shown here
requires it."
136
The action was then remanded to determine whether there had
been a violation of Brentwood's First Amendment rights when the
school was punished for distributing a letter from their football coach
to a group of middle school athletes. 37 The opinion of the Court
however was met with some disagreement that would again be
echoed when the action between Brentwood Academy and TSSAA
made its second appearance before the Supreme Court.1 38 Justice
Thomas, Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy
felt the entwinement relied upon by the majority to declare TSSAA a
state actor, was inadequate and had never been used before to
determine that an association was a state actor. 39 The dissent argued
that common sense would show TSSAA was not a state actor
because they were a private organization that was founded to
organize and sponsor tournaments and activities between member
schools. 40 The dissent further explained that TSSAA was not a state
actor because: membership in TSSAA was open to both public and
private schools, TSSAA was not established by the state of
Tennessee, and TSSAA was not funded by public school members
but rather by the tournaments that TSSAA organized and hosted. 141
The case was remanded to the Sixth Circuit, which remanded the
case back to the district court, this time to rule on the First
134. Id. at 299.
135. Id. at 301.
136. Id. at 302.
137. Id. at 305.
138. Id. at 305-15 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
Spring 2008 Fair Play
258 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 28-1
Amendment issue. 142 The District Court again ruled for Brentwood
and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the ruling,
with the majority holding that the anti-recruiting rule was a "content
based regulation of speech that [was] not narrowly tailored to serve
its permissible purposes."' 43 The Sixth Circuit also held that TSSAA
violated Brentwood's due process rights when they "improperly
considered exparte evidence during its deliberations." 144
B. Factual Background
The facts before the Supreme Court, in both this and the
preceding action, originated from TSSAA sanctioning Brentwood for
personal letters sent by the Brentwood head football coach to
individual middle school athletes. 145 The principal opinion of this
action focuses primarily on the First Amendment, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Ohralik decision in reaching the conclusion that
the actions of TSSAA did not violate Brentwood's constitutional
rights. 146
TSSAA is a non-profit organization established to "regulate
interscholastic sports among its members."' 147 Two hundred and
ninety public schools and fifty-five private schools in Tennessee are
members of TSSAA with Brentwood being one of the fifty-five
private school members. 148 For over fifty years, "TSSAA has
prohibited high schools from using 'undue influence' in recruiting
middle school students for their athletic programs."'149 In April 1997,
the head football coach at Brentwood Academy sent a personal letter
to a particular group of eighth-grade boys inviting them to take part
in Brentwood's spring practices. 5 ° In his letter, the coach told the
boys that football equipment would be passed out at the practices and
142. Brentwood, 127 S. Ct. 2492-93.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2493. (emphasis in original).
145. Id. at 2492.
146. Id. at 2494.
147. Id. at 2492.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
that it would be to their advantage to get involved with Brentwood's
football program as soon as possible. 151 The coach closed his letter
to the boys by signing it "Your Coach."'152 Each of the boys who
received one of these letters had filled out a contract saying they
planned to go to school at Brentwood, but none of them were actually
"enrolled" at Brentwood according to TSSAA standards.153 Every
one of the boys that received the coach's letter attended at least part
of the spring practice sessions mentioned in the letter. 154
TSSAA undertook an investigation, during which they held
several hearings, and corresponded with Brentwood in various forms
before any sanctions were handed down. 55 During the investigation,
TSSAA delivered a memo and follow up questions to Brentwood's
headmaster. 56  A hearing was held before TSSAA's executive
director and an advisory panel made up of three members from the
TSSAA Board of Control.'57 Throughout the investigation, TSSAA
notified Brentwood of all the charges against it, and Brentwood was
represented by counsel at each of the hearings.' 58 None of the
evidence offered by Brentwood was excluded from the investigation
or hearings.159
One of the allegations investigated by TSSAA, in addition to the
letter from Brentwood's football coach, involved claims that an
Amateur Athletic Union (AAU) coach, Bart King, encouraged
"talented middle school students - including a basketball star named
Jacques Curry - to attend Brentwood."' 160 TSSAA communicated
these allegations to Brentwood and received a letter from their
headmaster addressing the "allegation that King had told Curry that if
he attended Brentwood, he 'would probably have a car when he was
in the tenth grade." ' 16' Throughout the investigation, Brentwood
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Brentwood, 127 S. Ct. at 2492.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2496.
157. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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continued to state King was not affiliated with the school and was not
authorized to act on behalf of Brentwood. 162 However, in spite of
these defenses, TSSAA's director and advisory panel ultimately
declared Curry ineligible to play for Brentwood. 163 On Brentwood's
final appeal to TSSAA, Brentwood offered "testimony from Curry
and an affidavit from King denying the alleged recruiting
violations."' 64 After Curry testified, Brentwood explained that King
was present at the hearing and could answer questions, but the board
declined to call him as a witness. 165 The board then held an ex parte
proceeding where they met with two TSSAA investigators, even
though the investigators had not been cross-examined by
Brentwood. 166 The investigators offered handwritten notes detailing
their investigations, and Brentwood was never given access to these
notes. 1
6 7
"After reviewing the evidence, the board found that Brentwood
had committed three specific violations of its rules, none of which
appeared to involve either King or Curry," and the board reinstated
Curry's eligibility to play for Brentwood. 168  The board placed
Brentwood's athletic programs on probation for four years, banned
the boys' basketball and football teams from tournaments and
playoffs for two years, and fined Brentwood $3,000.169 Brentwood
alleged the punishment regarding the football coach's letter, under
the non-recruiting rule, was a violation of their First Amendment
rights.' 70  Brentwood also alleged that their non-presence at the
closed door meeting with the investigators violated their due process
rights, under the Fourteenth Amendment, and negatively influenced
the punishment handed out.171
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Brentwood, 127 S. Ct. at 2496.
165. Id. at 2497.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
V. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
A. Application of the Ohralik Case
Despite the fact that Ohralik factually involved an attorney being
punished by a state bar for in-person solicitation of clients, the Court
here felt the Ohralik reasoning and holding was still applicable to an
athletic association regulating the behavior and speech of its member
schools. 172 The Court felt Ohralik was applicable because the ban
applied in Ohralik was more of a ban on conduct than a restriction on
speech. 173 The Court explained that it has always been acceptable to
make certain forms of conduct illegal, even if that conduct involved
language, be it spoken, written, or printed. 174 The Court expanded on
this point by further explaining that the First Amendment does not
eliminate the State's power to "regulate commercial activity deemed
harmful to the public whenever speech is a component of that
activity."' 175 The Court supported this assertion by pointing out that
the prohibition of in-person solicitation of clients by lawyers did not
raise any substantial First Amendment issues. 176 The Court used
Ohralik to show the "evils" that are present with in-person
solicitation and the fact that those evils are very different from the
harms presented by "conventional commercial speech."' 7 7 The Court
stated that in-person solicitation may actually be more harmful than
helpful to the affected individual, because it could prevent the
individual from making a truly informed and reliable decision. 7 8
The Court paralleled the circumstances and reasoning of Ohralik
with the relationship between high school football coaches and the
danger of illegally recruiting middle school students who are trying
to decide where to attend high school.' 79
172. Brentwood, 127 S. Ct. at 2493.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 2494.
175. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Ohralik v. State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,
456 (1978).)
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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B. Principal Opinion: Justice Stevens
The Court began its analysis by explaining the scope and
application of the First Amendment as it pertained to Brentwood and
TSSAA in the case at hand. 180 The Court stated that the First
Amendment protected Brentwood's right to provide the general
public with truthful information, which included Brentwood's right
to use information about the school's excellence in sports in an
attempt to persuade prospective students to attend Brentwood. 8' The
Court, however, acknowledged that Brentwood's right to publish
information to prospective students was not absolute, and was in fact
limited because of their membership in TSSAA.'82
The Court then applied the Ohralik holding and reasoning to the
circumstances at hand and defined the scope of Ohralik's
application. 183 The Court explained that the narrow holding of
Ohralik applies only to "conduct that is 'inherently conducive to
overreaching and other forms of misconduct.' ' 184 The Court felt
"[t]he dangers of undue influence and overreaching" caused by a
lawyer's in-person solicitation are also caused by "a high school
coach contact[ing] an eighth grader."' 8 6 The Court reasoned that
"[d]irect solicitation 'may exert pressure and often demands an
immediate response, without providing an opportunity for
comparison or reflection."" 185 The Court stated that this pressure was
also likely to be present when a letter was sent from a high school
coach to an eighth grade athlete, inviting him to be part of a high
school sports team, because a letter of that nature was a relatively
weighty occurrence for an eighth grader. 188 The Court elaborated by
discussing that such a letter is unfortunately often accompanied by a
suggestion that failure to participate in the suggested activity will in
one way or another actually harm the young athlete's chances to
180. Brentwood, 127 S. Ct. at 2493.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 2494. (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 774 (1993).
186. Id. at 2494-95.
185. Id. at 2494.
188. Id.
participate in high school sports, further decreasing their odds of
playing college or professional sports.'86 The Court quoted the
coach's statement in the letters to the boys, "I do feel that getting
involved as soon as possible would definitely be to your advantage"
to show the power and potential influence of the suggestion.' 87 In
fact, when the Brentwood football coach was asked about the effect
his letter might have on middle school students, the coach admitted
that in some situations a middle school student would not believe his
participation in the practices was optional. 8 8 The Court felt that such
a strong effect on "youthful hopes and fears, could well exert the
kind of undue pressure that 'disserve[s] the individual and societal
interest.. .in facilitating informed and reliable decision making."' 189
Based on this comparison and application of Ohralik, the Court
framed the primary issue at hand as "whether the enforcement of a
rule prohibiting high school coaches recruiting middle school athletes
violates the First Amendment."1 90 The Court held that, under the
First Amendment, Brentwood has the "right to publish truthful
information about the school and its athletic programs" in an effort to
convince future students and their families that to enroll at
Brentwood because of the school's athletic excellence. 191 The Court
pointed out that Brentwood chose to join TSSAA, an organization
that was a state-actor, and that TSSAA had the "obligation to prevent
the exploitation of children, to ensure that high school athletics
remain secondary to academics, and to promote fair competition
among its members."' 192 The Court disagreed with Brentwood's
claim that TSSAA's interests were inadequate and that the rule was
too broad to justify TSSAA's violation of Brentwood's constitutional
rights. "'93 The Court instead believed that TSSAA's interests in
protecting students and promoting fair competition, with an
academics first approach, were important and adequate enough to
186. Id.
187. Brentwood, 127 S. Ct. at 2495.
188. Id. at2494 n.1.
189. Id. at 2494 (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 458).
190. Id. at 2492.
191. Id. at 2493.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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justify TSSAA's anti-recruiting rule.' 94 The Court also held the anti-
recruiting rule, under which Brentwood was sanctioned, was an
appropriate means to meet those interests.195 The Court began to
explain the holding in favor of TSSAA by stating that "[t]he anti-
recruiting rule strikes nowhere near the heart of the First
Amendment."' 96  The Court pointed out that TSSAA prevented
Brentwood from "recruiting individual middle school students," but
did not limit Brentwood's right to publish truthful information about
Brentwood's academics or athletics. 197 The Court explained that
there was a constitutional difference between "rules prohibiting
appeals to the public at large . . . and rules prohibiting direct,
personalized communication in a coercive setting."' 9  The Court
reasoned that because TSSAA member schools were still allowed to
"send brochures, post billboards, and otherwise advertise their
athletic programs," the regulation against individual recruiting "poses
no significant First Amendment concerns."' 199
The Court stated that at times, the government's interest in
running the workplace outweighs the employees' speech rights.200
The Court believed that similarly, there are circumstances under
which an athletic association's interest in "enforcing its rules
sometimes warrant[s] curtailing the speech of its voluntary
participants."201 The Court illustrated that it was obviously essential
for TSSAA to be able to place the necessary conditions on the speech
of TSSAA member schools to manage "an efficient and effective
state-sponsored high school athletic league." 20 2 The Court stated that
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. (citation omitted).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 2495.
200. Id.; see Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 151-52 (1985).
201. Brentwood, 127 S. Ct. at 2495 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of
Township High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). In Pickering, the Court
held there was the need for a "balance between the interests of the teacher, as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State,
as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees." Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.).
202. Brentwood, 127 S. Ct. at 2495.
no scientific research was necessary to show that using "hard-sell
tactics" with middle school kids "could lead to exploitation, distort
competition between high school teams, and foster an environment in
which athletics are prized more highly than academics.""2 3  The
Court believed that TSSAA's anti-recruiting rule sought to eliminate
the very behavior that would harm a high school athletic league's
"ability to operate 'efficiently and effectively'.""2 4 The Court held it
was only fair that Brentwood be required to abide by the same rules
as all the other schools, to ensure that TSSAA could run a
competitive and efficient athletic association.20 8
The Court also explained that even if the TSSAA's ex parte
hearing was deemed unconstitutional, the violation of Brentwood's
due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment was not serious
enough to affect the outcome of the trial.2" 5 The Court reasoned that
in fact, Brentwood was not able to identify in any way that
participation in the ex parte would have allowed them to develop a
"more effective strategy., 20 6  The Court reasoned that because
Brentwood was unable to identify anything in the investigators' notes
that Brentwood did not already know, there was no credence to
Brentwood's argument that they would have been able to raise a
better argument or achieve less serious sanctions if they had been
allowed to participate in the ex parte hearing.20 7
As a result, the Court held that there was no support for the
allegation that TSSAA had violated Brentwood's constitutional rights
under either the First Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment.208
203. Id. at 2495-96.
204. Id. at 2496.
208. Id.
205. Id. at 2497.
206. Id. at 2498.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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C. Concurring in Part and Concurring in the Judgment.
Justice Kennedy Writing, and Joined by the
Chief Justice, Justice Scalia, and Justice Alito
Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and
Justice Alito agreed that there was no difficulty in concluding that the
challenged anti-recruiting rule did not violate any of Brentwood's
First Amendment rights, but the Justices felt it was "both
unnecessary and ill advised to rely upon Ohralik in the matter."
20 9
Justice Kennedy supported this assertion by pointing out that,
"Ohralik, as the principal opinion notes, involved communications
between attorney and client, or, more to the point, the in-person
solicitation by an attorney of an accident victim as a potential
client. '210 Justice Kennedy stood by this argument in spite of the fact
that the Ohralik holding was later extended to prohibit "solicitation
of accident victims through direct mail."' 211 Justice Kennedy believed
the Supreme Court had not yet extended "the Ohralik rule beyond the
attorney-client relationship" and that it was therefore improper to
extend the holding in Ohralik outside of the attorney-client
relationship in this case, by applying the same standard to an athletic
association regulating the speech of its member schools.212
Justice Kennedy illustrated this by pointing out that the Court's
holding in Edenfield clearly explained that the Ohralik rule did not
extend to communications between an accountant and possible
clients.213 Justice Kennedy further stated that applying Ohralik
outside of the attorney-client relationship was improper because
nothing in previous holdings had removed all forms of personal
solicitation from First Amendment protection.214  And he further
noted that 'Ohralik's holding was narrow and depended upon certain
unique features of in-person solicitation by lawyers that were present
in the circumstances of that case. 215  Because none of these
209. Id. at 2498
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.; Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 774.
214. Brentwood, 127 S. Ct. at 2498.
215. Id.
circumstances were present in the relationship between Brentwood
and TSSAA, Justice Kennedy and the other concurring Justices
believed it was improper to extend Ohralik to apply to the case at
hand.216
Justice Kennedy reasoned that relying on Ohralik meant "the
principal opinion, at a minimum, is open to the implication that the
speech at issue is subject to state regulation whether or not the school
has entered a voluntary contract with a state-sponsored association in
order to promote a code of conduct affecting solicitation.,
21 7
Because of this, Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Scalia, and Justice Alito believed that while the proper result was
achieved by protecting TSSAA's interest to promote a fair and
efficient athletic association, the principal opinion's means of
achieving that end caused substantial problems with the basic
interpretation of the First Amendment.1 8
To allow free-standing state regulation of speech by
coaches and other representatives of nonmember
schools would be a dramatic expansion of Ohralik to a
whole new field of endeavor. Yet by relying on
Ohralik the principal opinion undermines the
argument that, in the absence of Brentwood
Academy's consensual membership in the Tennessee
Secondary School Athletic Association, the speech by
the head coach would be entitled to First Amendment
protection.219
D. Concurring in the Judgment: Justice Thomas
In concurring in the judgment, Justice Thomas argued that it was
improper for the Court to rely on Pickering to support the finding that
TSSAA's anti-recruiting rule did not violate Brentwood's First
Amendment rights.220 Justice Thomas stated that until the principal
216. Id.
217. Id. at 2498-99.
218. Id. at 2499.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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opinion in this case, the holding in Pickering applied only to the
speech of government employees and contractors.221 Justice Thomas
believed the Brentwood Court removed Pickering from its original
place and holding by applying it to the speech of a private school
when a private association was enforcing a rule of the private
222association. Justice Thomas pointed out that the Court was
required to make this stretch application of Pickering only because
they chose to recognize TSSAA as a state actor in Brentwood JL223
"Because Brentwood I departed so dramatically from our earlier
state-action cases, it is unsurprising that no First Amendment
framework readily applies to this case. Rather than going through the
bizarre exercise of extending obviously inapplicable First
Amendment doctrine to these circumstances, I would simply overrule
Brentwood /.,,224
While Justice Thomas believed the principal opinion was
incorrect in relying on Pickering, he believed it was even more
inappropriate to rely on Ohralik in these circumstances. 225 Justice
Thomas explained that for the reasons expressed in the opinion
concurring in the judgment, the holding in Ohralik was intended to
be a narrow holding that does not apply to Brentwood's facts. 226
VI. IMPACT AND SIGNIFICANCE
A. Social Impact
One of the largest implications of the Brentwood case is the
expansion of Ohralik as mentioned in the concurring opinion.227 As
explained, Ohralik had previously only been applied to the
circumstances surrounding a potential attorney-client relationship.228
The analysis in Ohralik seems to be primarily concerned with the
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.; see Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 315 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
224. Brentwood, 127 S. Ct. at 2499.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 2498.
228. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring); see Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 774.
dangers presented by the nuances and importance of the attorney-
client relationship. 229 The nature of the attorney-client relationship is
unique because of the attorney's specialized knowledge, persuasive
skills, and ability to bind their client to an array of actions and
decisions. Because of these characteristics, the Court in Ohralik
afforded special protection to the client and enacted a relatively high
standard concerning the permissible contact between an attorney and
a potential client. 230 The analysis by the Ohralik Court indicates that
special concern should be given to how an attorney goes about
soliciting clients and in turn, how much the client is able to
appropriately weigh her options and make an informed decision.231
While most would not argue with the appropriateness of this standard
to provide protection for the client in the context of the attorney-
client relationship, the same cannot be said when that high standard
of contact and speech is implicated to other relationships and
industries. In Brentwood, the Court explicitly paralleled the
relationship between an attorney and a prospective client, with the
relationship between a high school football coach and a prospective
student athlete. 232  The Court felt this was an accurate analogy
because they believed there was a similar potential for undue
influence and pressure between a football coach and a student
athlete. 3  The Court even explained the need to make sure that
academics were given precedent over athletics. 234 All of these are
admirable and legitimate concerns, but the Court did not give an
adequate explanation of the parameters of the holding or the
appropriate times when the Ohralik analysis actually should be
applied.
Not all relationships and circumstances are similar to the
attorney-client relationship and therefore should not be examined
under the Ohralik standard. However, the Court's application in
Brentwood arguably opens the door to that very type of application of
Ohralik. Ohralik had previously only been applied to ban in-person
229. Brentwood, 127 S. Ct. at 2498 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
230. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 461; see also Edendfield, 507 U.S. at 761.
231. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 461-62.
232. Brentwood, 127 S. Ct. 2494-95.
233. Id. at 2495.
234. Id. at 2495-96.
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solicitation by attorneys, but the Court's application of Ohralik in
Brentwood implies that the holding of Ohralik can be applied to any
situation where there is the opportunity for undue influence. More
specifically, this application leaves open the possibility of Ohralik
being used in any relationship between an administrative body and a
member organization.
Some would argue that this standard and application banning in-
person solicitation would be appropriate in any situation where most
individuals would not possess the requisite knowledge to make an
informed decision. Advocates of this application would especially
support this reasoning when the individual faces the possibility of
being pressured or influenced to the point that she would make a
relatively important decision without being able to consider all the
alternatives and possibilities. At first glance, this appears to be a
fantastic idea. Of course, we want to protect people from being
pressured to make important and binding decisions when they lack
adequate knowledge or time to make an informed decision. In fact, it
makes even more sense that we want to prevent adults from playing
on the youthful hopes and dreams of students, preventing the students
from making an informed decision that truly is in the student's best
interest. However, once we move out of the ideological world into
the practical world and seek to actually apply this standard, we find
that we may have caused more problems than benefit, and generated
more confusion than clear precedent.
Where can the line be drawn for application? Many
administrative bodies already regulate the advertising, language and
communication used by sales people of member organizations.
Would this application of Ohralik remove all persuasive speech and
in-person solicitation from First Amendment protection? In cases
such as Edenfield, the Court was careful to point out that Ohralik did
not remove all personal solicitation from First Amendment
protections, but in Brentwood, the Court seems to go against that
precedent.235 The Brentwood Court's use of Ohralik appears to place
the speech of all recruiters and salespeople in question. Under the
analysis in Brentwood the pitches of recruiters and salespeople would
be subject to state regulation as there is almost always the
opportunity for undue influence with in-person solicitation. The
235. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 761; Brentwood, 127 S. Ct. at 2498-99.
Brentwood application appears to do away with previous clear
boundaries for Ohralik and instead, open the doors to limitless
application.236 Outside of the attorney-client relationship, it would be
virtually impossible to draw a distinct line delineating just what were
proper times for in-person solicitation versus improper circumstances
for personal solicitation because those circumstances involved the
propensity for overreaching and undue influence. The Brentwood
Court's use of Ohralik essentially opens the dreaded floodgates of
litigation and may cause the Supreme Court to fight through
numerous cases and overrule precedent to set forth the appropriate
circumstances where Ohralik should in fact be applied.
One of the hottest topics in the arena of high school sports is the
issue of illegal recruiting. Many times, a student's ability to attend a
particular public school is determined by the student's physical
address within the school's district. However, a student may be able
to attend a particular high school outside of the district he lives in
based on the student's race and the racial distribution of the school
the student is hoping to attend. Despite strong restrictions on a
student's ability to live anywhere and attend any high school,
allegations of illegal recruiting are still prevalent when new student
athletes arrive and athletic programs succeed. The idea of illegal
recruiting is even more rampant within the world of private schools
because it was previously believed to be much more difficult to
regulate the conduct of private schools. To promote organization and
much more efficient competition, private schools have joined athletic
associations, allowing the schools to participate in state-wide
tournaments and playoffs. If schools choose to join a private
association, there are no constitutional issues as to the association's
ability to regulate behavior and speech of member organizations
under an agreement between the association and member schools.
These agreements would allow athletic associations to essentially put
endless rules in place to restrict the rights of member schools to
recruit student athletes. However, the most interesting twist on the
future implications of Brentwood occur as a result of TSSAA being
declared a state actor.
236. Brentwood, 127 S. Ct. at 2498-99 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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B. Legal Impact
Declaring TSSAA to be a state actor raises constitutional issues
for athletic associations across the country, blurring the lines of
permissible and impermissible regulations of speech and behavior.
Though TSSAA works with public schools and receives some
funding from those public schools, the bulk of TSSAA's income
results from the tournaments and events that TSSAA organizes and
hosts. 237 In addition, TSSAA was established as and intended to be a
private organization.238 However, the Court felt TSSAA acted in
place of the State Board of Education at times and was entwined with
public operations to the point that they were a state actor.239 This
decision makes it unclear just where the boundary lies of state actor
vs. private actor for an association or administrative body. As a
result, it will be unclear for administrative bodies, especially athletic
organizations, when they qualify as a state actor and just what they
can do to regulate the behavior of members. This uncertainty is
likely to cause excessive litigation and give the Court the unfortunate
burden of redefining the scope of Ohralik, when an administrative
body is a state actor, and the appropriate standards of First
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment protection for member
organizations.
In particular, the use of Ohralik and Pickering in Brentwood raise
issues of application for athletic associations and member schools as
well other similarly situated administrative bodies and their
members. The holding in Brentwood indicates that the speech and
conduct of all schools in athletic associations would be subject to
state regulation, regardless of whether the association or the school
itself is a private organization. 240 Justice Kennedy made this point in
the concurring opinion by stating, "By doing so, the principal
opinion, at a minimum, is open to the implication that the speech at
issue is subject to state regulation whether or not the school has
entered a voluntary contract with a state-sponsored association in
237. BrentwoodAcad., 531 U.S. at 306.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 304.
240. Brentwood, 127 S.Ct. at 2498-99 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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order to promote a code of conduct affecting solicitation.- 24' In
Brentwood, TSSAA and Brentwood are both private organizations,
however, TSSAA is declared to be a state actor.242 Brentwood also
holds that the regulation of member schools, both public and private,
are considered to be within the scope of TSSAA's state powers.243
Declaring TSSAA to be a state actor could cause confusion about
times when an athletic association is a state actor. The classification
of an athletic association as a state actor or a private organization
seriously affects the scope of action the association can take in
regulating member schools. Giving TSSAA's interests
predominance over the free speech rights of member schools, even
private schools, could have additional far reaching implications for
athletic organizations and member schools as well as similar
administrative bodies across the country.
At some point, the judicial system is going to be forced to further
delineate what exactly causes an athletic association such as TSSAA
to be a state actor when an organization like the NCAA has
continually been seen as a private organization. In NCAA v.
Tarkanian, the Court held that the NCAA was a private entity and
not a state actor despite the fact that they supervise and coordinate
the athletic efforts of virtually every major public university in the
United States.244 There the Court pointed to the fact that the NCAA
was a national entity, thereby somehow making them less entwined
with the public schools than high school associations who oversee all
the public schools in a given state. 245 In later cases, courts supported
their holding that high school athletic associations were different
from the NCAA and were state actors by reasoning that the schools
overseen by these associations all exist within one state. 246
In Indiana High School Association v. Avant, a student attempted
to transfer from a private high school to a public high school and
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 2498.
244. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 178, 193-98 (1988).
245. Id. at 193.
246. See Ind. High Sch. Ass'n, Inc. v. Avant, 650 N.E.2d 1164 (Ind. Ct. App.
1995) rev'd on other grounds; Tiffany v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass'n, Inc., 726 P.2d
231 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
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ended up losing a year of eligibility.2 47 The student challenged the
association's ruling and the court was forced to decide whether the
action taken by the Indiana High School Association qualified as
state action.248  The court held that the Indiana High School
Association was a state actor and attempted to explain the difference
between the Indiana High School Association as a state actor, and the
NCAA as a private entity.249  "Thus, an important distinction
between the NCAA and the IHSAA is that the NCAA represents
schools at a national level while the members of the IHSAA are all
secondary schools in Indiana." 25 ° Additionally, in Tiffany v. Arizona
Interscholastic Association, Inc., a student attempted to challenge a
rule that prevented all nineteen year old students from participating in
high school athletics. 25 1 The Executive Board denied his request for
a waiver of the age rule, even though he only turned nineteen because
he had been held back by his elementary school in kindergarten and
first grade.252 The court held that there was no question that the
athletic association was a state actor, acting under the color of law
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.253
However, now with many of the top high school teams playing
against teams from other states with each schools' athletic
associations overseeing the game and receiving money from
admission charges, it is not unforeseeable that soon an athletic
association could contain teams from different states. At this point,
something would be forced to give. Either the NCAA would then
have to be seen as a state actor or athletic associations would have to
be granted status as private entities. In either case, only more
confusion will ensue as a long line of precedent for either the NCAA
or high school athletic associations the other will have to be
overturned.
247. Ind. High Sch. Ass 'n, 650 N.E. 2d at 1165-66.
248. Id. at 1166-67.
249. Id. at 1169-70.
250. Id. at 1170.
251. Tiffany, 726 P.2d at 232.
252. Id. at 232-33.
253. Id. at 233.
VII. CONCLUSION
The accomplishments of Brentwood are two-sided. On one hand,
important steps were taken to ensure a level playing field among the
athletic programs of high schools and encourage high schools to give
academics the appropriate priority ahead of athletics. Brentwood
struck an important chord to make sure schools are treated equally
and have an equal opportunity for success in athletic programs. More
importantly, the Court in Brentwood took steps to make sure that the
interests of young students are protected from undue influence or
excessive persuasion. Brentwood also further developed the scope of
free speech rights under the First Amendment by illustrating another
instance where the rights of an administrative body preempted the
free speech rights of a member. Brentwood was an important
precedent to set forth an appropriate standard for the behavior of
coaches and member schools and the ability of TSSAA and other
state athletic associations to act to guarantee fairness and uniform
behavior among member schools.
On the other hand, Brentwood also expanded on previous
Supreme Court holdings and may have erroneously extended the
intended scope and holdings of those previous cases, causing more
uncertainty and harm than benefit. The use of Ohralik to support the
Court's holding creates the possibility of lower courts applying
Ohralik in inappropriate circumstances and expanding the holding
beyond the arguably intended narrow scope of the attorney-client
relationship. Not all relationships and circumstances need equal
treatment when it comes to the restriction of fundamental
constitutional rights, but the holding in Brentwood goes a long way
towards this dangerous occurrence. Brentwood removes the free
speech rights of an organization and does not clearly state the basis
for doing so. While the holding may be just and correct, the manner
in which the Court categorized TSSAA as a state actor and deemed
TSSAA's interests sufficient to override the free speech rights of
Brentwood, seemed to indicate that Brentwood's speech and conduct
would be subject to regulation even if they were not members of
TSSAA. A ruling of this magnitude sets a dangerous precedent that
could lead to several organizations being subjected to improper
regulation.
Only time and future litigation will tell whether the holding in
Brentwood will have more of the desired effect of equality and fair
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play, or the negative effect of improper expansion and disregard of
precedent. In either case, the possible implications are serious.
